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Abstract 
 
This paper examines British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s views 
on Anglo-American relations during the crucial year of 1947. It 
challenges  the view that Bevin was unquestioningly pro-American. 
It demonstrates how Bevin pushed the embassy in Washington to 
project a view of Britain, based on answering American criticisms 
robustly He saw Britain’s problems to be a consequence of American 
failures to act responsibly, as he saw it. Bevin was frustrated with 
American attitudes, and sought to bring them to underwrite his own 
policies and shape theirs around his strong belief that Britain had 
earned their support and that they should compensate Britain for its 
past sacrifices in the common cause. Bevin was not coldly 
pragmatic, nor was he uncritically pro-American, or merely a puppet 
in the hands of his Foreign Office officials  
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‘The impression is growing… that the United States is hard when dealing with us’: 
Ernest Bevin and Anglo-American relations at the dawn of the Cold War. 
 
 
In the years 1946 to 1948, United States foreign policy was in a state of flux. The US 
relationship with Great Britain that had been forged during World War II was one of many 
areas of policy that developed rapidly in response to the new conditions of peace, increased 
US economic power, the development of national security ideas and the commitment to 
continued active participation in world affairs. After a shaky start, with the reduction of 
military cooperation to a peacetime basis and the difficult negotiations over a loan from the 
US to Britain at the end of 1945, Anglo-American relations continued to develop uncertainly 
towards partnership in 1946. While former prime minister Winston Churchill’s plea at 
Fulton, Missouri for a renewed Anglo-American alliance tends to get most attention in 
narratives of the period, the man who mattered most on the British side was the Labour 
Government’s Foreign Secretary, the powerful labour union leader Ernest Bevin. He it was 
who conducted the British side of Anglo-American relations as the two countries gradually 
drew together again in close alliance. The key year in this process was 1947, with the 
Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, and the breakdown of cooperation with the USSR, and the 
path towards this end was by no means smooth. While the outcome was undoubtedly one of 
which Churchill approved, it should not be assumed that his and Bevin’s views of the United 
States and its connection to Great Britain and most importantly its attitude to British vital 
interests, were the same. Bevin’s views on this question have drawn plenty of attention from 
historians, but this article will argue that the picture given for this hinge year of 1947 is far 
from complete and has led to a distorted view of Bevin’s aims when moving the two 
countries towards a closer relationship. 
2 
Bevin as Foreign Secretary 
Assessments of Ernest Bevin’s tenure as Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951 have tended to 
divide into two main schools of thought. The scholarship that emerged in the 1980s, after the 
opening of the British archives for the period, tended to celebrate Bevin as one of the great 
foreign secretaries. Central to this claim was the assertion that he was the prime initiator of 
foreign policy in that period, able to lead and direct the Foreign Office (FO) by the strength 
of his character and the clarity of his vision.
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 He was particularly praised for what some 
claimed to be a ‘grand design’. Central to this design was the creation of a close alliance with 
the United States and the rejection of the idea of Britain being a ‘Third Force’ independent of 
and equal to the US and USSR, which was advocated by the left wing of the Labour party. 
Bevin worked hard to draw the United States into taking over some of Britain’s 
responsibilities, and so was, to some, a major influence in drawing the United States into the 
Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. The central text of this school of thought was 
the third volume in Alan Bullock’s study of Bevin, which went beyond biography to 
encompass an extensive engagement with policy-making. To Bullock and those who 
followed his lead, as well as many who served under him, Bevin was a skilful statesman, an 
effective combination of pragmatist and visionary, who played a seminal role in organising 
western resistance to Soviet expansionism, and most importantly in drawing the  United 
States into playing an active role in aiding and defending Britain and Western Europe 
through Marshall Aid and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The core 
of these endeavours were what Bullock saw as Bevin’s purposeful, and wise, pursuit of the 
revival of the Anglo-American alliance.2   
 An attempt to revise this depiction of Bevin emerged in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. To revisionists, far from being a visionary initiator of policy, Bevin was quickly 
drawn by his senior officials into adopting the FO’s interpretation of the situation: most 
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notably when it came to their rapidly intensifying hostility towards the Soviet Union. Bevin 
was essentially a tool in the hands of his officials, adopting their view of an expansionist 
USSR  that threatened British imperial interests. This led him to follow a policy, especially in 
Germany, which was more confrontational to the Soviets than it needed to be. He became 
readily susceptible to what is presented as a key concomitant to this FO policy, a  preference 
for a close Anglo-American alliance as the buttress for an anti-Soviet Western European 
grouping.3  
In contrast to Bullock’s near-hagiographic approach, revisionists depicted Bevin as 
narrow-minded in his anti-communism, exaggerating the Soviet threat and unrealistically 
seeking to maintain Britain as a world power.4 The main theme of much of this writing was 
that Britain missed an opportunity after the end of the Second World War to accept its 
diminished world role and to forge ahead as a leader of Western Europe.5 Historians had 
shown by this point that Prime Minister Clement Attlee had had misgivings about the 
maintenance of Britain’s worldwide commitments, and had dared to question some basic 
geo-strategic assumptions.6 Revisionists highlighted the role of Bevin in arguing Attlee out of 
these views. Bevin cherished a continued world role for Britain.  
It was pointed out, notably by John Kent and John Young, that until it proved 
impossible, Bevin did in fact see Britain’s potential to be a third power, equal to the United 
States and Soviet Union, based on the remaining British imperial territories and centring on 
developing the resources of Africa.7 However, revisionists, by and large, did not contest the 
idea that Bevin vigorously fought against the ‘third force’ advocacy of left wing rebel MPs 
led by Richard Crossman, and clashed in particular with them over the issue of close 
relations with the United States.8 Orthodox writers had celebrated the skill with which Bevin 
drew together the United States, Canada and the democracies of Northern and Western 
Europe into a coherent group able to resist Soviet expansionism.9 While revisionists 
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questioned the idea that Bevin was operating on the basis of a strategic plan, they accepted 
the established view that he was committed without reservation to a close Anglo-American 
cooperative relationship. Indeed, it was suggested that Bevin ‘loved the United States.’10 
Geoffrey Warner described the development under Bevin of an ‘obsequious dependence on 
the United States.’11  
Revisionism failed to dent the orthodoxy on Bevin, though Bevin’s limitations with 
regard to the Palestine issue, his attachment to the idea of development of the empire and his 
failure to follow through on the issue of the leadership of Western Europe have qualified the 
uncritical, indeed hagiographic, image. With consensus between traditionalists and 
revisionists on Bevin’s views of the United States, aspects of his aims in dealing with the US 
have remained under-analysed, amongst them the question of whether his foreign policy was 
actually based on a fundamentally different picture of the US to that of his left-wing critics. 
Thus, when Wayne Knight argued that Bevin and the FO were clearly committed to the 
Anglo-American alliance, and to projecting the image of Britain as America’s ‘sure friend,’ 
the implication is that Bevin’s views on the US were some way from those of the left. Any 
reservations he may have had regarding the predatory nature of American capitalism were 
subordinated to the policy of expressing positive opinions of, and gratitude towards the US.12  
 A point that a number of historians have made is that Bevin did not write his views 
down extensively. He kept no diary and was not a great letter-writer. If Peter Weiler is 
correct that officials in the FO were ‘ghost-writers’ of papers sent out under his name, then 
there are even fewer genuine unmediated examples of Bevin’s thought while Foreign 
Secretary.13 Of course, it was usual practice for Foreign Secretaries’ telegrams, Cabinet 
papers and memoranda to be drafted by others. For those trying to identify Bevin’s personal 
views independent of those of his officials, this poses a problem. It makes it difficult to 
challenge the idea advanced by revisionists that Bevin adopted the views of the FO.
14
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Moreover, Cabinet and Defence Committee records are not verbatim minutes, but summaries 
of discussion and conclusions, and in view of the principle of cabinet collective responsibility 
are designed to elide over differences of opinion. They are thus a flawed source of Bevin’s 
views. In a similar vein, his meetings with foreign diplomats were based on FO briefings – 
though careful deconstruction can sometimes identify Bevin’s particular and unique tropes 
and themes. However, it is striking how little direct quotation of the man himself there is in 
accounts of Bevin as Foreign Secretary, as opposed to telegrams and papers put forward in 
his name, but the product of the combined efforts of the Bevin and his drafting officials. 
Views are frequently ascribed to him from more or less indirect records, or from inference. 
However, Bevin’s personal views can be teased out from the record. Evidence of Bevin 
himself writing on key issues unmediated is particularly worthy of attention. When this is 
done for the key period of 1947, when Bevin in the established picture is seen as beginning to 
enact his plan of forging a close Anglo-American alliance, it becomes clear that his view of 
the United States and its policy to Britain was far from uncritical. Indeed, his advocacy of 
public expressions of gratitude and solidarity towards the US was increasingly qualified by a 
festering resentment – even as he defended the US against his own critics on the left – of 
what he saw as self-centred and ungenerous US policies.  
 
‘An ungenerous attitude’ 
Alan Bullock wrote that while Bevin was keen for the US to take a greater share of 
responsibility for the security of Greece, Turkey and the Middle East, he understood better 
than many of his colleagues and party members the difficulties that the Americans found in 
adjusting to this more active and interventionist peacetime world role. Bullock sees Bevin as 
determined to be patient and not to force the pace.
15
 Throughout 1947, as the US gradually 
came to be more assured in the new role, in the orthodox view Bevin was measured, calm 
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and skilful in moving them forward, calibrating his approach carefully. A fresh examination 
of the record gives a rather different picture of Bevin’s patience and understanding regarding 
American policies, and in particular shows him less attuned to, or tolerant of, the rhythms of 
US congressional and bureaucratic politics. To be sure, he pressed for patience and public 
support for American views.
16
 However, he had not found US Secretary of State James F. 
Byrnes a congenial negotiating partner while in New York for the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in November to December 1946, and it was not in Bevin’s nature to respond 
tolerantly to the kind of bitter criticism he received from elements in the US media regarding 
his views on the Palestine question.
17
 Moreover, as the year turned, there was a broad range 
of criticisms of Britain and its foreign policy being widely voiced in the United States.  
The start of 1947 saw the British government faced with multiple problems in foreign 
and economic affairs. Attlee renewed his challenge to the basis of British strategic policy by 
asking once again whether policy should be built around bases in the Middle East. Bevin and 
the Chiefs of Staff answered that Britain’s continued status as a great power, and the defence 
of its vital interests against a possibly expansionist Soviet Union required it.
18
 In a similar 
vein, but this time with Attlee’s support, the small GEN163 committee of the Cabinet 
approved the development of Britain’s own atomic weapon. As Bevin remarked, ‘I don’t 
want any other Foreign Secretary of this country to be talked at or by a Secretary of State in 
the United States as I have just had in my discussions with Mr Byrnes. We have got to have 
this thing over here whatever it costs…’19 A key achievement at this time was the Treaty of 
Dunkirk, re-forming the Anglo-French alliance (the only potential enemy mentioned was 
Germany).
20
 But the costs and difficulties of maintaining control in India and Palestine were 
recognised as beyond British means and the decisions were made in the first two months of 
1947 to withdraw from both – and also withdraw aid for the Greek government in its fight 
against communist rebels. The situation was aggravated beyond measure by the blizzards of 
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28 January, ushering in the harshest weather conditions since 1929. The resultant coal 
shortages brought transport and industry to a standstill in a way that German bombers never 
had, threw people out of work and caused considerable domestic hardship.
21
 Uncertainties 
about US policies remained strong after Bevin’s frustrating time in New York, and to cap it 
all, Bevin himself was ill, his heart suffering under the strain. It is not surprising that there 
should be pessimism on the other side of the Atlantic about Britain’s future. 
The British ambassador to Washington, Lord Inverchapel, had taken up his post in the 
summer of 1946. Even though American negotiators had, in British eyes, driven a hard 
bargain in negotiating the loan in the autumn of 1945, a bitter struggle had followed to 
convince Congress to approve it.
22
 This finally happened shortly after Inverchapel arrived in 
Washington, and both he and the FO defined his primary task as to convince American 
opinion that Britain was worth backing. Much of Inverchapel’s attention was therefore 
focused on signs of how Americans regarded Britain. Bevin had picked Inverchapel for the 
post, but their relations had soured a little when the ambassador tried to persuade Bevin to 
make a trip to the US to sway them with his personality. This kind of public relations 
exercise did not appeal to Bevin, as it might have to Churchill and he turned down the 
suggestion robustly.
23
 Inverchapel continued, however, to attempt to monitor the mood 
swings in Washington, and to influence it where he could. At the same time, he sought to 
explain it to Whitehall and to try to mould British actions so that they would play best in the 
Washington environment he observed. Bevin’s responses to this particular style of reporting 
and policy recommendation, far from showing his sympathies with the sensitivities of 
parochial American opinion, evinced his impatience not only with it, but also with the 
Washington embassy for apparently endorsing rather than countering it. To Bevin, the 
embassy’s task was to stand up for British interests and defend its viewpoints, and to build 
from there to persuade the Americans take action. The embassy on the other hand, saw its job 
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as primarily to ‘get on the inside’ and stay there, showing how close Britain was to American 
ways of doing things. The embassy saw its most important task as to sell Britain to the 
Americans as a going concern.
24
 Bevin’s personal dislike of such an approach, which 
contrasts with attempts of his FO officials to be ‘balanced,’ is shown dramatically in March 
1947 in a letter he wrote while in Moscow for the next Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. 
 On 10 March 1947, Inverchapel expressed his concerns about the latest 
manifestations of American misgivings about Britain and its Labour Government in a letter 
which went directly to Prime Minister Attlee, for Bevin was already in Moscow. The US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Inverchapel warned, were afraid that Great Britain and the rest of 
western Europe would be unable to resist Soviet pressure. Moreover, he felt that American 
caution about trusting Britain with atomic secrets was indicative of a broad trend in 
American opinion, as well as a specific response to the Nunn May espionage affair.
25
 He 
noted that there had been apprehension at the time of the British general election in 1945 that 
a socialist British government would align itself with the Soviet Union. This had died down 
when it became evident that there was continuity in foreign policy from the Churchill 
government and that nationalisation would leave the major part of the British economy in 
private hands. More recently, though, the volume of left-wing criticism of the government’s 
foreign policy, notably the Crossman resolution in the House of Commons in November 
1946, revived apprehensions that under this pressure the government would appease rather 
than resist Soviet encroachment. The resolution, which was strongly anti-American, and 
advocated the improvement of relations with the USSR, was easily defeated, but while the 
Conservatives supported the government, US apprehension was raised by the significant 
number of Labour MPs who abstained.
26
 A grave fear, Inverchapel asserted, had emerged 
about Britain’s ability, as opposed to will, to sustain her share of world leadership: ‘many 
intelligent Americans … ask whether even the British Isles can indefinitely remain proof 
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against Soviet blackmail.’ By announcing the withdrawal of support from Greece and 
Turkey, Britain was seen to have abandoned a ‘strategic commitment which we have hitherto 
strenuously upheld in the face of all domestic and foreign criticism.’ If this was not to be 
seen as the prelude to further yielding of ground to the Soviets, ‘we must seek suitable 
opportunities to show that we that have a clear conception of the commitments which are 
vital to our security and that we are confident of our ability to maintain the status of a great 
power.’27 
Attlee replied to Inverchapel himself, and also forwarded the letter to his Foreign 
Secretary.28 Bevin was moved to send a six page letter, written from the heart. He was at that 
time awaiting indications of whether the new US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, 
would be an improvement on his predecessor. Initial impressions of Marshall in the early 
stages of the Moscow meeting were not very favourable.29 The letter was written just five 
days after Truman made the statement to Congress that quickly became labelled the Truman 
Doctrine, and which hindsight has seen as a turning point in US attitudes towards 
intervention overseas.30 However, although he was aware of the speech, he does not mention 
it nor give any hint that he sensed a change in US policy doctrines, which rather undermines 
the argument advanced first by Francis Williams in 1952 that Bevin had deliberately timed 
the announcement of withdrawal of British aid to Greece in order to engender a response by 
Truman along these very lines.
31
 Instead, he launched a sharp critique of United States 
attitudes to Britain. 
Bevin acknowledged the ‘Crossman venture’, as he called it, had had an effect on 
American attitudes, though he had done his best to minimise it, with some success, in 
discussions with Byrnes and Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg. However, 
Bevin felt the problem went deeper than that. There were some matters the US government 
needed to remember. He had put these to Byrnes and he would try to impress them on 
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Marshall when he got the opportunity to talk quietly to him. Bevin then put the blame for 
Britain’s post-war difficulties squarely on the Americans, and specifically on the ‘sudden 
snapping of Lease-Lend.’ He said that at the time the loan was being negotiated he had 
impressed on Will Clayton, under-secretary of state with responsibility for economic affairs, 
that if the Americans took the action they proposed and did not give Britain time to stabilise 
itself, especially in food, then they would create a situation where they would have to step in 
and take over Britain’s responsibilities themselves. He had suggested to them that that was 
actually what they were after, but they denied it. Bevin said that he had then pointed out: 
(and this has a great bearing on their future attitude towards us) 
that if they treated us in the narrow conception then revealed 
we could not in the immediate future carry the load we had 
been in the habit of bearing. 
Bevin then cited the example of British support for Greece, and claimed that the 
British had met American wishes in that country, but had received no financial support, even 
though Bevin was ‘constantly emphasising that we were getting to the end of our tether.’ 
Bevin felt that US officials tended just to gloss over these matters. In a similar vein, Bevin 
turned to the issue of the former Italian colony of Cyrenaica, which Bevin at one time had 
ambitions to make into a British strategic holding. He blamed the failure to gain a good 
settlement of this issue squarely on the Americans. This, he said, meant the British missed a 
potential budget saving of £50 million a year. Bevin’s broad point was clear: far from seeing 
Britain’s economic problems as a sign of their lack of willpower or creeping socialism the 
Americans should recognise the impact of their own policies – and therefore see Britain in a 
different light.32 
The accuracy of Bevin’s recollections of the recent past is less important here than the 
fact that this was his perception. The issue clearly rankled deeply. In the letter, Bevin went 
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on to discuss domestic attitudes to the United States, in a manner which showed that he 
shared many of the views that had motivated the Crossmanite critique. These were the views, 
he was careful to say, of many of his great friends in the Labour Party who were by no means 
fellow-travellers (so they were not just motivated by an unthinking pro-Sovietism that meant 
their views should be dismissed). These people, Bevin said, with the implication that he fully 
understood this element of the views of his critics and even sympathised with it, were 
influenced in their view of Anglo-American relations because they felt that the United States 
administration ‘has given us a pretty raw deal.’ Sometimes, when focusing on Bevin the 
statesman, and basing analysis on FO records, historians can fail to factor into the equation 
his cultural background and the firm set of attitudes and perceptions that he carried with him 
from his working class and trade union background into government and diplomacy. Yet they 
were a by no means negligible part of Bevin’s world view. 
Focusing on the issue of food imports, Bevin reported, with evident sympathy,  
a growing feeling in England in the constituencies that our 
people are being kept on rations and going through difficult 
times as a result of what is sometimes regarded as an 
ungenerous attitude when it gets to business and not talk.  
He gave a homely example, that of his own charwoman, who had requested that she could 
start work an hour earlier, at 6 a.m., in order to be able to join the food queue at 10 a.m. so 
she would be able to feed her family. I am sure, he wrote ‘America does not understand what 
this means.’ These difficulties, he said, might be simple, but ‘they are burning deep.’ 
Britain’s economic problems were thus in Bevin’s view the United States’s responsibility – 
not a consequence of his global foreign policy as some of his critics alleged. When ministers 
went to the United States to try to improve this situation, they found, he claimed, that they 
faced greater difficulties than other countries that deal with America. There runs through the 
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letter an aggrieved sense that Americans discriminated against Britain. He appreciated 
interventions by individual American officials that eased immediate problems, but his 
gratitude was tempered by a strong feeling that such actions would not be necessary if it was 
appreciated what part Britain had played in the war and in international affairs since. 
There was no hostility to the US as such, he went on, ‘but the impression is growing 
and reflecting itself through some of the most loyal Trade Unionists and loyal members of 
the Labour Party [that is, not the Crossmanite rebels] that the United States is hard when 
dealing with us.’ He speculated that the problem was in departments other than the State 
Department, where departmental prejudice meant a failure ‘to understand the actual position 
and so in their actions to make contributions to a better understanding and good relations.’ 
He asked Inverchapel to mention these matters ‘when you are talking in your own way’, and 
ended typically bullishly, ‘I am not yielding to any pressure, if I may say so from anybody. 
But whatever happens we are going to get through. The United States Chiefs of Staff and 
others need be under no delusion about that.’33 
Bevin does not seem to have repeated these views in so many words to Marshall 
while they were in Moscow.34 Bevin had been unwell at the start of the conference, but his 
health improved and he became immersed in other problems. By the end of the long and 
fruitless conference, he and his officials had formed an improved view of Marshall’s 
capabilities – though when Bevin reported privately to Attlee, and warned that the ‘two big 
boys’ were increasingly lining up against each other, he did not entirely excuse the 
Americans of responsibility for this state of affairs.35 
This letter is particularly interesting in the light of the Cabinet discussions that had 
taken place in London before Bevin had left for Moscow on the subject of British aid to 
Greece and Turkey. Byrnes had given rather vague assurances that the US would assist with 
the burden of helping the anti-communist activities of the Turkish and Greek governments. 
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This was a burden that the Cabinet saw to be increasingly beyond Britain’s means. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton was pressing for complete withdrawal, but the 
Cabinet had decided to find out how much of the burden the US would be prepared to bear. It 
has been suggested that Bevin made sure this was couched in such a way to force the 
Americans to make a quick decision, by holding out the spectre of immediate British 
withdrawal. Robert Frazier has raised doubts that the British were quite so machiavellian in 
their strategy: this letter does show that Bevin for one was in a mood to take whatever 
opportunity offered to bring the Americans to ‘take up their responsibilities’ – but he does 
not seem to have seen the Truman Doctrine, which some claim the British demarche to the 
Americans deliberately provoked, as showing that they were doing this.
36
 However, it does 
give some substance to the idea, for it shows Bevin strongly concerned that the Americans 
pick up the burden that the British, in his view, had been carrying for far too long. On the 
other hand, his main emphasis was certainly not that the US should replace Britain, but that it 
should moderate its financial and economic policies to enable Britain to continue to maintain 
their shared interests. It was a broader American attitude, rather than just the matter of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, about which Bevin was so exercised. 
 
The Americans come through – after a fashion 
In the following months, the US government gave signs that it was moving to a new attitude 
regarding economic assistance for Europe, which culminated in Marshall’s speech at Harvard 
University on 5 June 1947, in which he said that the US would provide support if the 
Europeans devised a viable multi-national plan for recovery. Bevin acted with vigour to seize 
the opportunity and co-ordinate a European response – though not quite so fast as some 
claim.37 However, it remained the case that the British felt that their own economic situation 
was not being treated sympathetically, or with realisation of the consequences of the 
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conditions the Americans had insisted upon for the post-war loan.38 The Americans made 
clear that they would not help individual European countries, or give aid ‘piecemeal,’ and 
also said that this included Britain, which was not to be treated as a special case.39 The run on 
sterling caused by convertibility and the failure to address the issue of the valuation of the 
dollar meant that Marshall’s initiative notwithstanding, Britain faced a severe financial and 
economic crisis in the last five months of 1947. This situation brought out once again Bevin’s 
sense of grievance regarding the US policies that he believed were responsible for the crisis, 
and his impatience with reports that the Americans were doubting Britain’s own moral 
strength as a consequence of the problems they themselves had induced. This is evident in 
another interaction with the Washington Embassy, and this time Bevin’s ire was ostensibly 
directed at the embassy itself, though the real target was once again what he saw as 
unjustified American attitudes (which the embassy, he thought, was tolerating rather than 
soundly refuting).  
Sir John ‘Jock’ Balfour, who was the chargé d’affaires in Washington at the time, had 
reported on 8 August concerning American criticisms of a British decision to withdraw the 
last of their garrisons from Greece.
40
 He had gone on to describe a cluster of American 
views, raising the familiar spectres once again: American suspicions that British problems 
were of their own making, due to their laziness, weakness and economic unproductivity, 
coupled with a drift to the left that made them inclined to appease the Soviet Union. There 
was a belief, Balfour reported, that the British had, in New York Times journalist Arthur 
Krock’s words, ‘deadlinitis’: that is, that they tended to leave it to the last possible moment to 
announce major policy shifts, which always amounted to retreats. The implication was that 
they were using this tactic to force the Americans to take over their responsibilities by 
hustling them into making quick decisions in a contrived atmosphere of crisis.41 
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 While the FO officials found some truth in these remarks, and noted the US 
viewpoints merely for information, Bevin exploded. He scrawled on the letter that Balfour 
was ‘quite out of focus’ and ‘his mentality is not good.’42 A few days earlier, on 31 July, 
Bevin had spoken sharply to US Ambassador Lewis Douglas. During a conversation on the 
British desire to nationalise coal production in the Ruhr valley region in Germany, Bevin said 
that Britain would not be ‘put in the dock by the US just as we had always refused to be put 
in the dock by the Soviet Union. We were not in dock in 1940 nor would we be now.’ He 
told Douglas that Britain was going to withdraw its military mission from Greece. Two days 
later, Douglas told him Marshall was concerned at developments in British policy in Greece, 
Italy and the Middle East. In return, Bevin gave no ground, stressing how he had quickly 
responded to Marshall’s Harvard speech, and saying that Britain, France and Italy needed 
temporary aid.43 He was thus already quite fired up over American attitudes when Balfour’s 
report came to him, and was clearly reacting quite differently to his officials. He now 
outlined a reply to Balfour, which, if sent, would have replicated, if not surpassed, the 
language of the March letter to Inverchapel.  
Bevin said that he resented the suggestion that Britain used ‘shock tactics’ with the 
Americans. The question of withdrawal of troops from Greece was discussed, he said, a year 
ago. The problem was, he thought,’ that until we take definite action, the State Department 
does not take us seriously’. Bevin went on to argue that the deadlines were imposed by the 
dollar, and had been advanced earlier than expected because Truman had lifted controls on 
the dollar, leading to a 40 percent reduction in its value. This went against pledges made 
when the loan was negotiated and seriously reduced the actual value of the loan and therefore 
the time it lasted. The British need for interim aid to keep it going between the imminent 
exhaustion of the loan and the implementation of Marshall Aid had become acute.
44
 Bevin 
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added that Britain had been in Greece for three years, when it had originally intended only to 
be there a few months. Warming to his criticism, he added, 
…when we went in there, we received no support from the 
U.S. and certainly no kind words from them. We were tilted 
at and pulled to pieces in the U.S. on all sides. 
The rant continued. It must be made clear, he argued, that ‘we do nothing under Left-Wing 
pressure. HMG [His Majesty’s Government] does not conduct their policy under pressure 
from any particular section or pressure group.’45 As in March, he made a gibe at the lack of 
American actions to back their words, in pointing out that US demobilisation had been 
‘infinitely greater’ than that of the British, when their relative populations, financial position 
and responsibilities were taken into account. He ended with a further criticism of the 
Americans for failing to support Britain with regard to the retention of its garrison in Egypt. 
The note of his views concluded on a typical note:  
As regards resistance to Communism, the Secretary of 
State feels that no one – and certainly no U. S. statesman – 
has shown as firm and as consistent resistance to 
Communism as he has himself.46 
In the end, the letter was not sent. Inverchapel was in England, and Bevin was persuaded by 
his officials that the ambassador could convey his views to Balfour in person.47  
 In the months that followed, the embassy continued to report such views as 
characteristic of American opinion. In September, Bevin made an off-the-cuff suggestion 
that again revealed his inner sense of impatience with American policy. He proposed that a 
release of gold from Fort Knox would at one stroke address the financial crisis. American 
opinion did not take kindly to this remark. In November the head of the British Information 
Service in Washington, Bill Edwards, again launched a stinging attack on ‘deadlinitis’.  The 
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embassy staff were in fact caught between a rock and a hard place.48 They had been 
encouraged by the FO in the belief that their prime task was the positive projection of 
Britain. To do this, they had identified certain key themes that would play well with 
American officials, Congressmen, journalists and public opinion. They would emphasise 
continually that Labour reforms had left 80 percent of the British economy in private hands, 
that the Crossmanite rebels were unrepresentative, that the British empire was reforming in a 
progressive direction, and most importantly that Britain was a strong-willed and reliable 
partner in the conflict with Soviet-backed communism.49 This projection strategy was 
complicated by the main outcome desired in Whitehall during 1947, which was American 
financial help. Emphasising the strength of Bevin and Attlee’s anti-communism helped, but 
the embassy accurately perceived American (especially congressional) misgivings about 
giving aid to Britain. Americans did not like to feel they were sponsoring state socialism, but 
more important than that – and this was harder to combat – was the distaste at helping out a 
lame duck. Comments like Bevin’s Fort Knox proposal only served to reinforce the idea that 
Britain expected a handout.50 It was believed to be vital to demonstrate that Britain was a 
going concern, working flat out to solve its own problems, and determined to do so. But at 
the same time Americans needed to be impressed with Britain’s urgent need for help. It was 
a fine line to walk.  
Bevin’s personal tendency was to emphasise that Britain’s problems derived from 
past American actions. This was not seen in the embassy or the FO to be a very fruitful line 
of argument to pursue. But the embassy’s failure to place the blame on the US brought down 
Bevinian complaints that they were not being robust enough in answering American 
criticisms. It was the embassy’s job to report American attitudes – but when they did so, 
Bevin reacted as if to report them was to endorse them. To a degree, there was some truth in 
this, in particular with regard to the issue of ‘deadlinitis’, a characterisation of British policy 
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with which the embassy clearly agreed. Bevin’s reaction was to see the embassy as having 
‘gone native’ and would no tolerate that. Bevin’s style inclined towards the crudely direct: 
while he usually kept this in check when working with the FO, whose approach tended more 
to the suave, this instance is one example, fired by his frustration with the Americans, when 
he let his feelings show.  
These expressions of Bevin’s viewpoint produced a concrete result later in the year in 
changes to the staffing of the embassy in Washington. Cabinet frustrations had continued 
that the Americans did not realise that Britain needed interim aid to tide it over before 
Marshall Aid began. Envoys and missions were despatched to lobby in Washington, but the 
more the government sent, the more Whitehall continued to feel that the Americans did not 
understand – and once again, and certainly unfairly, the embassy was blamed. A jittery 
Whitehall simply would not take into account the rhythms of Washington politics. 
Statements by American officials like under-secretary of state Robert Lovett, that Europeans 
needed to sacrifice some of their customs and traditions if they were to deserve American 
aid, did not help.51 When Sir Stafford Cripps suggested sending a minister out to explain the 
situation, Bevin resisted this intrusion into his bailiwick, but then sent off instructions to 
Inverchapel full of implied criticism of the embassy’s failure to tell the Americans straight 
what they needed to do:52  
Things are getting pretty tough here… I want you to be fully 
in the picture of all our difficulties and plans here and of our 
determination to win through. Then you can go in with a 
fighting spirit and push our various requirements with 
maximum effort.53 
Bevin, for all the information he received from the embassy about domestic attitudes 
and political processes in the United States, showed little understanding of the way that 
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things worked in Washington. Thus, at this point, as on the occasions earlier in the year 
noted in this paper, at heart his attitude was that the Americans needed to be shown in stark 
fashion that Britain was not responsible for its economic and financial plight, the Americans 
were. He was frustrated when he felt that this message was not being put across in the clear 
and unequivocal manner that he himself had expressed it. He plainly did not see that when he 
had tried to do so, as in his ill-conceived suggestion about the Fort Knox gold, it had had 
quite the opposite effect to the one intended.  
As it turned out, Inverchapel, Sir Oliver Franks, who was heading a mission from the 
Committee on European Economic Cooperation, and the others actually in Washington were 
proved correct. Working at a pace determined by the political situation, Congress, called into 
special session by Truman, did start to address the problem in a helpful manner. However, 
Bevin remained dissatisfied with the messenger, and, concurring with the view of officials 
that the embassy was out of touch with the situation in Britain, he decided that Inverchapel 
should be replaced. Ironically, Bevin’s choice of successor was Franks, who had shared the 
embassy’s belief that Whitehall was panicking.54 Once again, however, Bevin had acted on 
the idea that American views were unreasonable and that robust rebuttal was the way to 
change them.  
 
Conclusion 
Bevin’s forceful communications to the British embassy in Washington during 1947 offer a 
window into his inner thoughts. His frustration with the Americans is very evident, and 
shows Bevin to be by no means coldly pragmatic, nor a puppet in the hands of his Foreign 
Office officials. While they echo remarks that had been heard from time to time from FO 
officials dating back as far as the 1920s, the evidence suggests that the focus and approach 
was expressive of Bevin’s own attitudes, unmoderated by institutional axioms. Incorporating 
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these forceful expressions of opinion and pithy images modifies the picture of Bevin being 
single-mindedly in pursuit of the Anglo-American alliance, prepared to set much aside in 
return for ‘standing close to America,’ and in strong contradistinction to the left-wing critics 
of the United States within the Labour Party. They usefully demonstrate a certain cultural 
distance between Bevin and his officials, which the nature of much of the documentary 
record of British policy formulation can obscure. Bevin was not entirely comfortable with 
the approach the FO had evolved since 1944 of ‘steering the unwieldy barge’ of US foreign 
policy by getting close to US policy-makers.
55
 Bevin preferred a more robust policy of 
standing up for British viewpoints, defending them rather than either apologising for them or 
modifying them to meet US domestic political sensitivities. The Labour left wing found him 
too subservient to the US and he strongly defended himself against that charge – while 
distancing himself from left critics of the US by avoiding endorsement of their anti-
American rhetoric. However, in private, his views were not so distant from these critics as 
they appear. 
 This extended to the contentious issue of his attitude to the concept of a Third Force. 
Bevin strongly asserted Britain’s status as a Great Power.56 It has been shown that while . 
Attlee and Bevin’s conception of the Third Force stressed its anti-totalitarian aspect stronger 
than did that of the left, making the US a closer partner for it than the USSR could be, they 
continued through 1947 to cherish ideas that Britain’s power-base could be based on the 
‘middle of the planet’ independent of both the US and the USSR.57 Bevin’s views as 
explored here do, however, show how he felt that the Americans should acknowledge 
Britain’s right to this independent status and to accept the way that it had been compromised 
by their own economic policies: Britain’s sacrifices in the common cause justified their 
modifying these policies and in effect underwriting Britain’s independence without 
undermining it. 
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 Thus, for the crucial year of 1947, a synthesis of traditional and revisionist views on 
Bevin is most appropriate. Bevin indeed sought to call in the New World to revive the Old, 
but he saw distinct limits to the price that should be paid by Britain for that aid – indeed, to 
him, much of the payment had already been rendered in advance. The revisionists’ Bevin, a 
domineering personality with an egotistical reaction to opposing viewpoints, rather than a 
calm, pragmatic planner, is in evidence here.  
Recognising Bevin’s frustrations with the Americans also provides a fuller 
understanding of his pleas to them to become more involved in Western European security 
after the final Council of Foreign Ministers broke down in December 1947. He continued to 
reiterate his theme that the Americans must be brought to face their responsibilities – for 
instance in discussion with French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault at the time they signed 
the Brussels Treaty in March 1948.
58
 The views noted here suggest that he did not simply 
mean that the Americans should take over British responsibilities, or under-write the British 
empire, or adopt British strategic thinking. His view, as he wrote forcefully to Inverchapel, 
was that the Americans had been acting irresponsibly and this had been the root of many of 
Britain’s post-war problems. Getting restitution for this was not only a matter of a certain 
justice, but might also ease Britain’s problems so that she would cease to be so dependant on 
the United States. The special relationship as developed by Bevin was thus supposed to 
preserve British independence, not compromise it – even to allow, eventually, for the 
creation of the Third Force. Bevin was undoubtedly, along with Winston Churchill, one of 
the architects of the Anglo-American special relationship, but there was a clear contrast 
between Bevin’s views of the relationship and Churchill’s uncritical, even romanticised, 
approach to Britain’s ally. 
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